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Abstract 
 
Australia is moving to a national e-health system with a high level of interconnectedness. The scenario for 
recovery of such a system, particularly once it is heavily relied upon, may be complex. Primary care medical 
practices are a fundamental part of the new e-health environment yet function as separate business entities 
within Australia’s healthcare system. Individually this means that recovery would be reliant on the self-
sufficiency of each medical practice. However, the ability of these practices to individually and collectively 
recover is questionable. The current status of information security in primary care medical practices is 
compared to the needs of information security in a broader national e-health system. The potential issues that 
hamper recovery of a national system are the poor understanding of security at the end-user level currently, and 
the lack of central control. This means that in this environment where independence is promoted, the major 
concern is national coordination of recovery from a major incident. The resilience of a medical practice to cope 
with a cyber-security incident is important. Resuming normal activity within an acceptable time frame may be 
vital after a major attack on Australia’s infrastructure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Resilience is the ability to recover, returning to an original state, after some event that disrupts this state (Collins 
Compact Australian Dictionary, 1999). In the true sense of the word it is synonymous with pliable and 
stretchable: malleable but not breakable. For the purposes of this paper, cyber-resilience considers how 
malleable medical information security is, and considers its ability to return to a normal functioning state. 
  
Australia has recognised for some time that the increasing demand for health services has driven the agenda to 
utilise technology to provide quicker and more cost effective patient care. With an aging population, inequities 
in health care delivery and a problem in access to skilled health workers, the government has had to search for 
alternative solutions to healthcare delivery. This requires a nationally connected health system to be established 
and a shift in the culture for Australians to take more responsibility for their own health outcomes.  Australia’s 
national e-health system strategy aims to transform a paper-based system into an electronic system within ten 
years (AHMAC, 2008). Thus we will increasingly rely on an interdependent health system for which the impact 
of potential cyber attacks cannot be underestimated. Health services are a critical infrastructure sector for 
Australia (Australian Government, 2010), and incapacity of this infrastructure would seriously affect the social 
welfare and healthcare of the Australian population.  
 
The paper reviews the state of security in primary care and then takes a broader, national perspective of e-health. 
A comparison of the security demands of both perspectives is made with particular reference to the resiliency 
and interdependence in security. 
 
THE STATE OF PRIMARY CARE MEDICAL PRACTICE SECURITY 
 
Primary care medical practice forms the backbone of healthcare in Australia. One in four people visit their 
doctor every two weeks (NEHTA, 2010c). As the primary providers of healthcare, medical practices function 
independently as small businesses, although linked to and guided by national expenditure systems. The 
operational running of medical practices is not a national concern or under direct governmental control. The 
only provision is that it there are sufficient providers of healthcare to meet the strategic goals for the nation.  
Research has shown that the state of security in medical practice is Australia has room for significant 
improvement (‘Information Security; Insecurities plague electronic health care ‘, 2010; Williams, 2008a). It 
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must be remembered that security is not the core business for medical practice. Primary care, like many parts of 
the health system, is time and resource poor with limited knowledge or understanding of information security. 
They use information technology as a tool and security is a necessary but not vital part of this. It is the lack of 
knowledge and acceptance of the reality of risk which causes the problem. This sector of healthcare is primarily 
driven by the professions in regard to its validation and endorsement in all aspects of its operations.  
 
In regard to information security, the Royal College of General Practitioners (RACGP) accreditation guidelines 
and standards provide a criterion on privacy and one on information security. The stipulations in Criterion 4.2.2 
Information Security (RACGP, 2010) are simplistic at best. However, these are vastly improved from the 2005 
version. In regard to disaster recovery the guidelines state that  
 
When a practice uses computers to store patient health information, the practice needs to have 
a documented plan (a ‘business continuity’ plan) in the case of an emergency (eg. power 
failure) in order to protect and save the information stored in the computers. This plan needs 
to consider all critical areas of practice function such as making appointments, billing patients 
and providing adequate clinical care. Once a plan has been formulated, it needs to be tested 
regularly and documented. All practice team members need to be familiar with their 
appropriate actions for their role within the practice” (RACGP, 2010). 
 
This is a good start yet in reality it means that the practice has a disaster recovery plan that does not address the 
implications in a nationally networked and connected arrangement. It is also questionable as to the extent that 
these plans are developed, understood and effectively tested. Most aspects of security at this policy/procedure 
level are outsourced to third parties or provided as proforma from the accrediting bodies. Thus, they are not 
specifically developed by each practice and therefore less responsibility is assumed for their contextualisation 
and application to that particular medical practice. In addition, current disaster recovery plans are focussed on 
individual practice recovery only. One of the issues with this scenario is that it is left to the individual practice to 
source and pay for expertise in this area. Of more concern is that the new RACGP guidelines still refer to the 
General Practice Computing Group guidelines that have not been updated since 2005 (GPCG, 2005). Funding 
and expertise is needed to rectify this in light of the push for e-health.  
 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON E-HEALTH SECURITY 
 
Australia embarked on the development of a national e-health system in 2004. This is being implemented by the 
government funded National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA), however its progress to date has been 
slow. The focus for the national e-health design is secure messaging. This is because the e-health system itself is 
made up of the connections between health providers and does not constitute a functionally stand-alone 
information system.  
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Figure 1. Health identifier (HI) service and its connections (NEHTA, 2009a). 
 
The proposed secure messaging only addresses the secure transfer and transportation of information (NEHTA, 
2010a). It is not concerned with security of the initiator/sender of the information and the receiver. In a 
distributed environment where applications are linked there is increased vulnerability because whilst the transfer 
of data may be well protected it is the end points (end-user systems) that have significant vulnerability and are 
open to attack threats. The formulation of this approach has been based on open-source standards and to 
increase the potential for interoperability because of the structure of Australia health care providers system. 
 
Figure 1 indicates how the information exchange will occur for the national e-health system. The system of data 
exchange is secure however there is no consideration of the end-points and access points: the HI Service 
Channels include primary care practitioners, healthcare providers and patients. This is where the vulnerabilities 
lay. Indeed NEHTA specifically states that the “storage, use and onward transmission of information provided 
to authenticated and authorised users of the HI Service” is outside its scope of development (NEHTA, 2009b). 
Interestingly, NEHTA undertook a limited risk assessment of end-user security access, yet only included 
hospitals and not primary health care providers. This severely limits its conclusions on end-user security issues’ 
considering it is expected that some 500,000 health care providers will participate in the e-health system. It 
notes that the data collected will inform Participation Agreements and suggestions for security design of third 
party software. Whilst the HI Service itself will be extremely secure, as yet the aggregation of data and the 
model for running the e-health system is still in development. Unfortunately, the prime concern has been the 
secure transfer and communication of information and not the security or resilience of the e-health system as a 
whole.  
 
Divesting Security Responsibility 
 
The Participation Agreements (NEHTA, 2009b) that form part of the national e-health strategy suggest that 
responsibility for security is transferred to the individual healthcare provider. It is proposed that these 
agreements are enforced with responsibility supported by legislation, however no such legislation currently 
exists. The current baseline security for medical practices is covered by professional accreditation and the 
Privacy Act. Neither of these is specific, nor does either of them include best practice security. Also, this solicits 
the question of ‘how will it be enforceable with over 500,000 healthcare providers?’ This is not to say that each 
healthcare provider will not implement security to the best of their ability, however at present the level of this 
implementation is poor and often misunderstood (Wears, 2005; Williams, 2008b). 
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The security of the e-health system focuses on the use of personal health information and is covered by the 
overarching statements such as “federal privacy law, state and territory health records, personal information and 
privacy laws” will be applied and the use of the “healthcare industry codes of conduct relating to patient 
confidentiality and the security of patient health information” (NEHTA 2010c). This leaves a gap in the overall 
e-health environment where the national system is vulnerable and its resilience undefined and even 
unconsidered.  
 
Reliance on Special Technology Services 
 
Around the world there is considerable interest in the use of technology for remote patient-doctor consultations 
(Daimi & Song, 2010; Griffiths & Christensen, 2007). The reliance on unique technically based services such as 
telemedicine using the Internet or similar capacity communications is an attractive proposition for healthcare 
delivery in Australia. Australia is a massive land mass with many remote and rural communities where 
healthcare delivery is inequitable with those in major urban and metropolitan areas. Telehealth, for states such 
as Western Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory, is proving to be a viable and cost effective 
alternative (Telemedicine, 2010a; 2010b). The government plans to expand the telehealth initiative with funding 
support and implementation of infrastructure. The real-time security of individual consultations is not an 
insurmountable problem using cryptography protocols already in place.  That is, the security of the consultation 
will be secure. However the issue is not one of security but of increasingly utilisation and reliance on these 
services. A major infrastructure or end-user cyber incident would render these services non-operational.  
 
With the issues of limited overarching responsibility for security by NEHTA, the devolvement of responsibility 
to end-users, and the reliance on technology identified, it is necessary to analyse how this could affect 
Australia’s cyber resiliency in healthcare. 
 
COMPARISON 
 
The Australian Government (2010) report on critical infrastructure resiliency clearly states that coordination and 
planning are a necessity. At the same time it acknowledges that the private sector owns and controls the majority 
of the infrastructure. It is an immense task to assume control of a diverse system in the event of a major incident. 
Thus, the first step in the case of healthcare is to make healthcare providers aware that they actually form part of 
Australia’s critical infrastructure. As Strategy Imperative 2 of the report cites, there is a need to promote an 
understanding of organisational resilience. However, more than this there is a need for healthcare providers to 
both recognise and action this imperative. Being aware and understanding are not enough.  
 
The problem with the situation is that the end points of the system are the greatest vulnerability in terms of 
cyber attack and in displaying cyber resilience. If an attack were to occur on the infrastructure of the national e-
health system (the transfer and exchange of information), this would be problematic and cause disruption and 
delay but the health of individuals could still be catered for. Once the resumption of communications was 
effected, the data exchange part of the system could be functional again. However, if an attack were to occur 
that crippled multiple end-points to the e-health system, this could cause major problems for the delivery of 
healthcare to the community. In addition, without functional end-points there is no e-health system.  
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Figure 2. Representation of information security responsibility. 
 
Figure 2 gives an indication of the separation of responsibility within Australia’s healthcare environment. Whilst 
there are levels of responsibility from an entity viewpoint, the dilution of control from the central point outwards 
poses a dilemma, whilst the dependency increases. The e-health system (layer 1) is dependent on the outer 
layers (2 & 3) to function. Under normal operating circumstances this system may function well. Any minor 
interruption will not necessarily disrupt the whole system’s functionality. Similarly, any major or minor event in 
layer 3 is unlikely to significantly adversely affect layer 1. However, a major cyber incident in layer 2 would 
cripple layer 1 and detrimentally affect layer 3. The situation is complex due to the multiple independent and 
diverse contributors to the health system, and the indeterminate nature of the boundaries between providers. The 
layers are no discrete and distinct.  
 
Recognition of these problems is not sufficient. Strategy that incorporates responsibility and coordination of 
recovery is required. Unless a national approach is taken, Australia is not only vulnerable but is not resilient.  
 
Critical Omissions 
 
There are several issues that should raise significant alarm.  
 
From a national perspective: 
 
 A colossal gap in the development of Australia’s e-health system is any acknowledgement of the potential 
for disaster, business continuity and recovery. There is no mention of it in the NEHTA strategy or 
operational documents.  
 
 There is no security responsibility for the e-health system as a whole. Therefore no coordinated control 
function has been defined in the event of a major infrastructure failure or cyber incident.  
 
 The NEHTA documents fall short in guidance and recognition that the providers of the healthcare 
information may be an area of concern. Whilst this may not have been within the scope of their objectives, 
it should at least be acknowledged as an issue that would need addressing.  
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From a primary care healthcare provider perspective: 
 
 Current guidelines are incomplete in information security practices. Despite stated involvement of the 
RACGP with NEHTA (NEHTA, 2010b) in developing the standards, the updated 4th edition of standards 
are dangerously deficient in the area of information security (RACGP, 2010).   
 
 Primary care is not being encouraged to take a larger view of their individual contribution to a national e-
health system and what responsibility this entails. The aspect of business continuity and disaster recovery 
needs more emphasis. The view of recovery needs to be broader and more emphatic.  
 
The issue to be addressed is not that the government should control all layers of the healthcare system 
infrastructure (Figure 2), rather that there is national recognition of the inherent vulnerability in its construction 
and use. From a national perspective, security policy and responsibility needs to be given more credence. The 
possibility of cyber threats occurring and the resultant detrimental impact is real. The very characteristics that 
have given us the ability to contemplate and develop a national e-health system are also pivotal to its potential 
destruction. Computing and telecommunications provide the capability and interoperability required that makes 
the Internet such a success. Yet, it is this accessibility that also causes the insecurity.  
 
What is not considered here is the motivation and ability of individuals or state actors to carry out deliberate 
attacks on Australia’s healthcare system. Whilst this is an important factor with which to drive national strategy, 
it is not reasonable to base protections on incalculable risks. Given the undefined and unsubstantiated nature of 
cyber threats, it is better to ensure that the protections exist in the first place.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
If Australia’s future healthcare system is to increasingly rely on the digital environment, with cyberspace as its 
primary communication method, then potential cyber security issues and disaster recovery must be addressed. 
The e-health system is a national asset and therefore must be dealt with on a national level. Leaving recovery to 
individual uncontrolled sections of the healthcare system is insufficient and dangerous. Whilst the protection of 
the infrastructure itself is within the national security remit, the resulting recovery effort needed in individual 
healthcare provider businesses will be left to chance. Australia’s resiliency of this critical system will be 
measured by this.  
 
Current research is looking at the issues in the end user environment including the vulnerability of medical 
software, security governance, and security capability within General Practices. A coordinated and multifaceted 
approach needs to be adopted quickly if Australia is not to become a fatality in the cyberspace environment. The 
ability of primary care practitioners to recover as independent entities means that there is no control over how, 
when or even if, they will recover. Without direct government involvement or some form of coordinated 
approach the resilience of our health system is haphazard at best and may fail entirely at worst. Australia is 
vulnerable because of the structure of its healthcare environment. There is no accountability for coordination in 
the event of such a disaster. The improvements we make in healthcare through e-health connections may also be 
our greatest vulnerability.  
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